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COMMENTARY
WADE H. McCREE, JR.*
My principal reaction to Professor Kurland's paper is that his analy-
sis is too rigorous. I am not certain that I disagree with any of it, but I
wonder why a decision like the Brown' case should be subjected to
such vivisection, or to use his play on that, dissection. It was a decision
whose time had not merely come, but was long past due. I, for one, am
not troubled by the fact that the decision may not be internally consis-
tent. It just had to be decided that way and Professor Kurland agrees
that it was the correct decision. Also, the earlier papers presented in
this series seem to agree that Brown was correctly decided.
In this connection, I want to make an observation that may or may
not be original with me. I can assure you that I have not read it any-
where and it may not withstand a rigorous analysis. It seems to me that
academicians and judges perform quite different roles that are comple-
mentary to one another and are significant in the development of the
law. Judges principally concern themselves with deciding cases and
controversies, but they always know that the academicians are looking
over their shoulders to see whether their decisions are consistent with
precedent and legal analysis. This symbiosis of academicians and
judges permits our law to grow responsibly. The judges prevent its
stagnation as they decide different cases and controversies according to
their sense of justice. Nevertheless, they keep the growth of the law
within bounds because they know that the academicians will be highly
critical whenever there appears to be an abrupt or unprincipled depar-
ture from past precedent. Academic and judicial forces working to-
gether have significantly aided the development of the law in the
United States, where our courts perform their function somewhat dif-
ferently from the way courts do elsewhere and academicians are vigi-
lant critics of the judicial product.
In considering school desegregation, the academicians look at Brown
and observe that it did not overturn Plessy;2 that it did not say that race
* Solicitor General of the United States. A.B., 1941, Fisk University; LL.B., 1944, Harvard
University; LL.D., 1964, Wayne State University.
1. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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was an impermissible basis for classification, but seemed instead to rely
on a new awareness-a new insight into the consequences of the appli-
cation of the Plessy separate-but-equal doctrine within the public
school area. The critics observe that in subsequent cases the Court ac-
ted as though it had indeed overturned Plessy. At least this is what I
understood Professor Kurland to say this morning.
Perhaps the Court had to undercut Plessy in this manner. That it did
and" that the approach is vulnerable to Professor Kurland's analysis
does not trouble me at all. We were a nation that had just come out of
World War II and had assumed responsibility for world leadership.
We were charter subscribers to the United Nations concept. We had
this malignant practice within our body politic and we had to get rid of
it the best way we could. The Court did what had to be done at that
time.
Professor Kurland suggested to us that instead of the phrase "with all
deliberate speed,"'3 the Court might have looked to Shakespeare to find
a better model. I think it could have stayed with Francis Thompson's
poem, "The Hound of Heaven,"4 because as I remember it, the next
line after "deliberate speed" is "majestic instancy." That certainly
would have been a more appropriate remedy, but perhaps the nation
was not ready for it.
Brown is now history and the emphasis has moved, as Professor Kur-
land pointed out, from desegregation to integration. I am convinced
that our greatest difficulty with integration comes from the fact that we
have concentrated our efforts on public schools. It is easier to desegre-
gate public schools than it is to integrate them. One reason is that
many neighborhood patterns developed in response to de jure segrega-
tion of schools, and where these patterns still exist, neighborhood at-
tendance practices produce de facto segregation.
Nevertheless, the public school system continues to be central to inte-
gration efforts because we first achieved success in that area and the
schools are convenient targets: persons must attend school and it is
easy to count numbers and to make racial classifications. This reason is
illustrated by one of the Marx Brothers' movies that I saw many years
ago. One of the brothers was looking for something in the gutter. A
police officer came along and asked, "What's the matter? Did you lose
3. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955).
4. F. THOMPSON, 1 THE WORKS OF FRANcIs THOMPSON 107 (W. Meynell ed. 1913).
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something?" He said, "Yes." And he identified the object he had lost.
The officer asked, "Where did you lose it?" And he replied, "Half way
down the block." The officer asked, "Well, why are you looking here?"
He said, "Because the light's much better."
I think that the pressure is kept on the schools because the light is a
little better, as bad as it is. Let me give an illustration of this point. In
Detroit, my legal residence, the school board is effectively controlled by
a majority of black persons. The superintendent of schools and his
principal assistants are blacks, but Detroit is under a court order to
desegregate the system. One would think that these persons who have
the political power to do as they see fit would hardly need the coercion
of the courts to do so. Nevertheless, in Milliken v. Bradley5 the Court
issued such an order, even though most of the defendants are persons
who would be expected not to require the mandate of a court to bring
about a desegregated system.
The problem in Detroit, of course, is, as Professor Kurland properly
points out, that the record failed to show that the State of Michigan
used school districts in the past for its own convenience. As recently as
twenty-five years ago, Michigan had about five hundred school dis-
tricts. It now has forty or fifty districts as a consequence of consolidat-
ing the vast numbers of districts that were too small to permit the
furnishing of an effective education. The state consolidated and dises-
tablished school districts as its educational wisdom indicated was ap-
propriate. If the record had made this clear, it would have been easy
for the Court to afford a statewide remedy instead of stopping at a
school district line. Since the court did stop at the district line, how-
ever, Detroit goes through the charade of trying to integrate a school
system where the public school population runs higher than seventy-
five to eighty percent black.
Another troubled area is that implicated in the Bakke6 case-affirm-
ative action. Critics of that decision say that it also does not mesh with
prior law, but again it seems that the Court tried to decide a case the
way it felt it had to for the good of the republic. Once again, the scru-
tiny and criticism of the academic community has focused on a judicial
decision and it remains to be seen whether the progeny of Bakke will
5. 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
6. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
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invite the same critical analysis that Professor Kurland has made of the
sequela of Brown.
Finally, it seems that the nation has looked to its least powerful
branch of government, the judiciary, to do its most difficult jobs. A
moment's reflection teaches us that the courts cannot do these jobs
alone. The task of eliminating two hundred years of racism cannot be
accomplished without the support of the other two branches, which are
more powerful, more flexible, and more capable of the fine-tuning nec-
essary to take care of particular instances. I think that those of us who
love our country, who respect our system of law, and who venerate our
courts must keep the pressure on the other two branches to see that the
courts are not required to do all the work by themselves.
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